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PREFACE 
This thesis represents research in the general field of 
emergent evolution. The works of Lloyd Morgan and s. Alexander 
were studied in particular and the works of others in allied 
fields were used in a supplementary oapaoity. It maintains 
that Morgan offers a unique personal interpretation or the 
universe. Its purpose is to ~1ve an understandin~ of Mor~an'e 
scheme and to call attention to certain problems within the 
limits of his theory. 
In the process of the development of this thesis, the 
following libraries were used: The Library of Con~rees, 
Washington, D.C., The Virginia State Library, The Richmond 
Public Library, and The University of Richmond Library. I 
wish to aoknowledge here the courtesies extended by the staffs 
of these libraries. 
I wish to give recognition to my fellow-student, George 
Crabtree, who read the manuscript and gave valuable or1t1c1sms. 
It is with a sense of sincere appreciation that I oonsider 
the main advisor to this thesis. The imperfections entailed 
are in no instances due to his counsel end the positive oontr1-
but1on that it makes ~ay be traced to the teaching and influ-
ence of Dr. B. c. Holtzclaw. 
Richmond, Va. 
May, 1947 
TO 'MY WIFE 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem of metaphysics is one of the most baffling, 
yet one of the most interesting in the field of philosophy. 
From the time of Anaximander, many different views of evolu-
tion have been offered as a solution to th1s problem. ·The 
one that we shall discuss is a comparatively modern one and 
is expounded by Conwy Lloyd ?Jorgan. Twelve books by l~organ 
haver!S'ubl!shed and most of these d~al with the hypothesis 
of emergent evolution. His greatest work was the book entitled 
"Emergent Evolution" whioh embodies a comprehensive preeen• 
. ' 
tation or the hypothesis fro~ beg1nning to end. Thus, the 
greatest part of my disouss~on will be concerning the princi-
ples set forth in this work. It ts my purpose in this thesis 
to offer certain problems that confront Lloyd Morgan's soheme. 
As a prelim:lnary, I believe it is prof! table· to discuss the 
two greatest 1nfluenoes upon Morgan to enable us to r~oeive 
a better understanding of h.is system. The outstandlng influ-
ences are Professor s. Alexander and the field of biology. 
Some of I!organ• s most essential views are taken from Alexander, 
but there is a parting between the two men upon other points. 
Chapter five will be devoted to these diff'orenoes. The presen-
tation and explanation of Morgante emer~ent evolution ie the 
topic for Chapters two, three and four and the problems enta1led 
are presented in Chapter s1.x. Then, my conclusions are offered 
INTRODUCTION (CONT'D) 
in the final chapter. It is difficult to say just what 
another person means in new langua~e symbols. For this rea-
son; I will frequently resort to quotations. In this thesis, 
I wish to give a complete synopsis of emer~ent evolution as 
it is propounded by Morgan and present various problems that 
arise concerning it. 
A,,, Biology 
CHAPTER I 
INFLUIDTCES ON MORGAN 
Conwy Lloyd Morgan, an English philosopher and scientist, 
began his works with the publication of "Animal Life and 
Intelligence" in 1890. In this volume, ho dealt with organisms 
and their development. He was very much impressed by the close 
linkage of the structures of tho nifferent animals. He was 
also convinced that life was scmiething that was progressing 
and.capable of all sorts of ohen~es. "Life today is not what 
·1 
it was yesterday, ~or will 1t be tomorrow the same as today" • 
. 
By observing and studying various animals, he concluded that 
the organism was fitted to respond to certain influences of 
the external world and that these influences could in turn 
cause particular developments in the organism. By an elaborate 
set-up of experiments, be disoovered that animals possessed 
1. pg. 182 Animal Life and Intelligenoe by c. L. Morgan 
intelligence, but he would not ascribe reason or rational 
powers to them. This study was basia to his later belief 
2 
in mental evolution. He inferred that the lower stages or 
mental development were connected with the perceptual sphere 
(eye) and the higher stages were conneoi:ed Y;ith the conceptual 
, 
sphere (brain).· Hie next tv10 worlrn, "Introduction to Compara-
tive Psychology" end 11 Psychology for Teachers" were both writ-
ten 1n 1895 snd deal with aortain themea ot practice for 
teachers and basic psychological concepts. However, they had 
little significance in his emergent evolution hypothesis which 
arose later on. In 1896, "Habit and Instinct" was published. 
This oonoluslon was reaahed."thot wh:toh is outs:tde experience 
oan afford no data for the oonsoious guidanoe of future be-
1 
havior," Re found that experience was a pre-requ1site for 
planning and there exlstod a.oloee alliance between emotion 
and instinct. Consciousness was aeen as the awareness that 
characterized the lov1er level of extstence as well as the 
higher. "Animal Behavior" (1900),. "The Interpretation of' 
·Mature" (1905), and "Instinct and Experience (1912) were 
works that brought forth further research in the b1olog1oal 
field and thereby offered more hints to emergent evolution. 
By the time his 1905 publ1oat!on y;as made, !!.organ had in mind 
emergence as an interpretation of all reality but the aotual 
1, pg. 131 Habit and Instinct by c. L. Morgan 
3 
expounding of the complete hypothesis was made in the Uni-
versity of st. Andrews in 1922. "Emergent Evolution" foll-
owed in 1923. This partiouler book provines the source for 
the groater part of this theais for lt ls he:rc that the view 
of emergent evolution culminates and is advanced 1n entirety. 
However, Morgan's later publioat1.ons were intended to shed 
further light upon the subject. "Mind At The Crossways" 
{1929) and "The An1T!1al Mind" (1930) ere further attempts. to 
elaborate the emergence of mind within the general scheme of 
emergent evolution. They go 1.nto detail but add only a small 
amount to the original assumpt1ons. Hie final work, "The 
Emergence of lJovelty" (1033) is a restatement of what is in-
cluded in h1a main volume. It attempts to clarify the diff· 
erent kinds of evolution an<l tnsiet upon the emergence of a 
new kind of reln tedness alrendy discussed in "Emergent Evolu• 
tion". Tho moat 1Mportnnt book, other than the main voluoeJt 
is nL1fe 1 Mind and Spirit" (1926) in which the role of Spirit 
is discussed in relation to life and mind as emergents. 
Because ·Of profound scholarship and genuine interest in 
the biological fiela, T~organ was competent enough to attempt 
a solution to the hiator~cal controversy between v1tal1sm and 
mechanism. A nynopets of thts problem will be given here be-
oauae biology was one of the ~reatent foundations for Morgan's 
entire phrlosophy. In the n~c-old atte~pt to explain adequately 
those things that exist before us involving life, two well-
4 
formulated theories are advooated'. These are meohanism and 
vitalism. 
Mechanism, sa 1 ts name ind1oa tes, is the explanation · 
that interprets organisms as mere machines. Organisms act 
and function 1n their respeotive ways because they are so 
constructed as to produce the result that is obtained. 
"Living organisms may 'be regarded as conao1ous or unconscious 
l 
physical and chemical mechanisms." Researohes in th1.s field 
have established certain facts t..het support the theory. One 
of these is the faot that the matter of wh~oh or~anisms are 
composed is reducible to the sa~e ohe~ioal elements as are 
found outside the body. No new matter 1s formed in the body, 
or disappears from it. Another argument offered 1s that the 
whole of the energy which is liberated in the body, whether 
as heat, mechanical work, or in other forms, oan be traced to 
sources outside the body. Then, we can conclude that the two 
great physical laws or conservation of matter and oonservat1on 
of energy can thus be extended to all living organisms, even 
human beings. In answer to the objeot1on based on the ex!st-
enoe of oonsoiousnese, meohanists say·:tt makes no difference 
to the energy balance of the body whether an animal is oons-
oious or not. so, consciousness !s treated as an aooompan1~ent. 
1. p. l Mechanism, Life and Personality by J. s. Haldane 
It is an aooompaniment of physical and meohan1oal action, 
but not something that alters in any way the physical an~ 
chemical changes which it scoompanies. This additional set 
of ootis1derst1.ons 1a offered by the mechanist. "In all 
biological investigations we are investigating either struc-
ture or activity, and when we eome to details -we find that 
the structure is physical and ohem1oal structure and the 
activity phya1oal and chemical aot!vity. Hence, biology 
1 
oan be nothing but the physloe end chemistry of organ~ems." 
Fur~her support 1s argued from the history of biology. In 
. 
the fiold 1or physiology, Dorel11 applied the principles of 
5 
meohanios to elucidate the action of the muscles on the limbs. 
Kepler applied tho principles of optics to the action of the 
eye, in vision. Harvey made advances relating to the problem 
or the circulation of the blood by physical observation and 
interpretation of the facts in meohen1oa1 terms. These faots 
are used to support the pril!'iary idea that orp;an1sms e.re phys1oo-
ohem1cal oCYMpounds and that all behavior may be analyzed 1n 
terms of the laws or physics and chemistry. The wonderful 
complexity, accuracy and oo-ordiTiation of the physiological 
mechanisms found \v1th!n the bodies of living organisms may 
be accounted for on purely meclmn1cal principles. There 1s 
no real purpose. The th~ng rre call purpose is merely apparent 
l. p. 4 ?leohanism, Life and Personality by J. s. Haldane 
6 
and is in its essential reallty, merely a meohantoal pur-
poseless phye!oo•ohemical reaction. 
. , 
V1 ta lism, on the other hsrio, c la lms the t there is an 
essential and fundamental dlfferenoe between l:hrin~ organ-
isms and purely inanimate th1ngs. They regard this raot 
as to some degree self-evident. Anyone realizes that those 
organisms we see before us are of a different nature than 
mere stones. They admit the phys1nal and chemical con-
stituency of organisms but go on to insist upon the pre• 
senoe of an immaterial purposive agency. Driesch with 
his "enteleohy" or vital principle and Bergson with his 
"olan vital" or vital force, insist that there is some-
thing outside mere physical and chemical laws that gives 
life its essential nature and oauseo it to funot1on 1n an 
inte111gent,purpos1ve, and harmonious way. Some v1tal1sts 
offer as a proof of vitallsm the fact that we can construct 
a grain of wheat with the exact chemical proportions of a 
real grain and glve it proper nour1shment but it will not 
come up and g:row. We oan compose ari egg, 1dent1dal to the 
, 
hon•a, but it ·Will not hatch. This illustrates the fact 
thnt life cones from life and there is nothing that pro-
duces llfe within itself. Of oou~ee, the strongest basis 
of v1tal1sm is that there is no scientific evidence at all 
of the spontaneous genernt1on o!' life f~om non-11.fe. Aga:!.n, 
7 
as opposed to the denial of purpose or at least, the extreme 
skepticism. about it* wh1ch we fh'id in meehs.n1sm, v1te.liem 
rests its case on teleolgy and refers to the harmony of run~­
tion snd regularity of nature to substantiate auch a belief. 
Theso two views nre, however, ohallenged ~ Uorgan and 
others vd.th the oonoept of emergence in biology. "Th& fact 
of emergent evolution !s more conspicuous in the renlm of 
orge.ni.sm than in the domain of things. All the great steps 
in evolution - the makinR of the body, the establish~ent or 
a brain, the beginnin~ of the blood, the different1at1on of 
sense organs,eto., were new syntheses w~th new 1ntrins1o 
qualities and new extr1ns1o propertiesu. l Thie idea of 
emergence in biology says that the oharaoter1stics of an 
organism are novel, and not reducible to physical and ohem-
1cnl lows. It is a genoral law of nature that when co~pounds 
res.ch a hlghor degree of co'?'l~pleAJ.ty, such wholes develope 
oharacteriattcs not expl1~able in terms of their parts. Such 
cr..aro.cter1st 1cs a.re called ';emer,CTeni;a". Life is an eme':"gent 
and belongs to the general scheme of emergent evolution. 11 The 
naturalistic contention is that, on the evidence, not only 
a tons and molecules t but organlsma a:id minrls are suoceptible 
of treatment b'v scientific methciis funna"!'t'le-:itall:r of l!ke kJnd1o 
1. P• 206 Concerning Evolution by Thompson 
a 
that all belong to one tissue of events; and that all exemplify 
, 
one foundational plan. In other words, the pos1t1on is that, 
in a philosophy based on the prooenure sanctioned by progress 
, 
in so1ent1f1o research and thought, the advent of novelty or 
any kind is loyally to be'aooepted whenever it is found with-
~ , 
out invoking any extra-natural Power (Force, Enteleohy; Elsn, 
or God) through the efficient Aot1v1ty of whioh the observed 
. 
faots may be explained."1 Therefor~, we oan not only do away 
with mechanism with its insistence of phys1eo-chem1cal assent-
. 
ialness but also with v1talism, with its out~ide or al!en in-
fluence that gives life. Whoeler says "we are, I believo, 
bound to assume that the or;\nnization is entirely the work 
of the components themselves and that it 1s not 1n1t1nted end 
directed by extraspatial or extratemporal th1ngs•"2 
1; p. 2 Emergent Evolut!on by c. L. Mor~an 
2. P• 159 Essays !n Ph11oeoph1ca1 Biology by Wheeler 
9 
B. s. Alexander 
In the year 1916, several years before Uorp:an•s "E!!terp:ent 
-
Evolution", Professors. Alexander leotured at the University 
of Glasgow and gave the first oomprehenslve scheme or emergent 
evolution. These· lectures were entitled, "Space, Time and 
Deity" and were delivered during a two year period, then pub-
lished in 1920. Thera are various things in Alexander's two 
volumes on "spaoe 1 .T1me and Deity" that are found essential 
to Morgante scheme. In this section we shall revert to the 
most important influences on Lloyd Morgan from Alexander's 
theory. 
The first thing Mo~gan retsina from Alexander ls the 
space-time basis for all r~al1ty, end the independent exist-
ence of the physical world. Alexander, in explaining his 
philosophical views on nature as a whole, bids us think away 
all that has emerged in the course of the evolutionary process. 
~ 
We are to do away imaginatively with ideals and h1~her values, 
rational powers and mental abilities. Think away mind itself 
with its attributes and oontinue subtracting until the animal 
world is obliterated. Let all 11ving th1ngs :fade from exist-
ence and reduce the in~rganio remainder to purely spatio-
temporal relationships. This spaoe-time purports to be an 
1nexpugnable remainder because it 1s,1mposs1ble to 1~ag1ne 
away beyond this point. This basis must be retained. 
lo 
It ia evident that Alexander would have to !stop some-
where in this schematic subtracting process for :!.t tro.n-
oends the human l!tind to .roduoe all things to noth1ns. If we 
attempt to conceive the world of exietenoo as apace and 
-
time in the traditional sense, it is incomprehensible be-
cause we are driven to the question of eesont1al relatedness 
between physlcal things on the one hand and space and time on 
the other. Howeve~ it is reducible to spaoe-t1me instead of 
space and time and the plausab111ty of th~s will be discussed 
at a later point. There 1e rio mere durati.on or mere exten-
sion·-··just apaoe-time. It follows that 1t is necessary 
for Alexander to postulate the oharaoteristice or space-time. 
and he does this from a viewpoint or oless1f1eat1on trad1t• 
1onally used for apace itself. He aooepts the triple aspeot 
) 
[ 
or tr1-di~ensional nature or space nnd inoludee in his ex-
planation a. triadio view or timo to enable him to couple the 
two together u~t1mately. The first aspect of time is the 
fact that it'ie irreversible in direction. A second aspect 
is that each instant is between two·lnstnnts. Then, duration 
in suooession offers a th1rd aspect to fit in w~th tri-
dimentional space. · "Now the three features enumerated in 
Space and T1.me being 1nnepe,..,dent we m·r s:tht content ourselves 
with saying that as between spatiality and successive dura-
tion there subsists such a oonneot:!.on of interdependence 
11 
that eaoh new feature in Time is rendered possible by a new 
. 1 
dimension or Space and convoreely rendoro lt poosibl~." 
Alexander means here th.at the reason why Space hns th~ee 
. , 
dimensions is t~nt time ie successive, irreversible, and 
un1f orm in direction. 
Alexander continues to explain spnce-t1me in the l1r;ht 
or perspectives. A perepeot1ve epaoo-time is merely the whole 
of' epe.ce•t1me as it is related to a point-instant b~.r virtue·· 
of the line of oonneetion between it and other polnt•inetants. 
From this I believe we are oo!'reat in assmnlng that n per-
spective in general of space-time from one po1nt-1netant, 
differs from the perspective from another point-instant, 
whether the perspectives be taken in respect of the instarts 
or points, and we see that polnts merge into pot~ts, and 
instants into instants eaoh because of the other. 
Again, we oatoh a glimpse of npe.oe-time through math• 
emat1os. When the universe was in this stage of evolution, 
there was latent in this space-t1~e all the poasibl~ geomet-
rlcal and abstract laws that apply to space and tlrne,Alexander's 
. ; 
empirioal and geometrical spaoe, are identical, because both 
types of point-instants have a universal and identical 
character or structure. In reality, we discover these laws 
1. p. 51 Space, Time and D&ity by s. Alexander 
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of mothmntios and do not invent them• 
Morgan does not review the deta11a or Al~xendor's space~ 
time but aooepts them under the hea~ing of acknowlodg!!:ent, 
which we shall see at a later point. AlexErnder views timo 
as the ''ntlnd" of space and apace as tho "body" of time. 
This means thnt we may think of tho rclnt:ton o.r time to 
spac~ in the same senee ne vre do the relntion of mind to 
body. The mind is the dyme.nio, driv:tng force of our bodies 
and we must look to time as tho r:enerator of all emergents. 
The first nnd simplest relation of all existence !a that all 
finites are merely oonneoted toFether within the one spaoe-
time. Alexander uses the word ''oomprescnce" to explain this. 
, 
A thing affects another, with whioh it ia ooropresent, differ-
ently aoaording to the latter's re~ative position in space or. 
, 
time, or its 1ntr1ne1o recept1v1ty. Sinoe space-time !s oont-
inous, things sre not out off fro'!!'! orie another, ana a thing 
itself. contains other th1nr,:s £Ind ie part ln turn of a larger 
complex. Every finite ie a part wh!oh subsists within space-
tlma and so fal' as it retains its mm lndividual character, 
it is aooomodated or adapted to its surroundings in epnce-
time. Fro~ such early relationships of the first point-
. . 
instants, the physical unh,.erso oame 1rto 'being. 
A aeoond lmpo~t~nt point ~n Alnxander's philosop!1y is the 
concept of e-nArgenoa. Aloxanoer c1n1mn thnt new "qus.l:ttiee" 
13 
emerge. Re would say that at some stage or 1nor6tln1o evol• 
" 
~tion this or that so-called seoondary quality, such as 
. - " 
oolor, emerged. '!hen, at some later stage of the evolun-
bionary process, the quality of 11~e em~rged and still later 
hhe quality of oonsoiousn~s! arose. so, with Alexattder the 
emergent is a new quality. ~~organ continues the idea or 
" 
emergence and attempts to clarify it, as we shall see later, 
hhough he views the emer~en~s as new types of relatedness 
rather than new "qualities". Uorr;an tries to make his emer ... 
~enoe more inclusive. than is generally impl1od by Ale:xan.derts 
" 
"quality", whioh does not have neoesse.r~ly the same conditions 
preceding it as "relatedness" must have. ttout of one level 
. 1 
in the heirarohy of levels a new kind of existenoe emerges." 
. 
Thue we note that in both systems, the concept or emergence is 
basic and that new qualitie~ and types of relatedness are th& 
things that actually emerge. Alexander and Morgan both start 
with epaoe-time and the resulting em$rgents are considered 
supernatural or supe~enlent to that le"lfel of existenoe from 
which it emerged. :rn both philosophies the inorganic world 
. 
comes first, then life, then consciousness; and then mind 
emerges. There is also a parallel between the hierarchy ?f 
lev&ls of existence and their repeot:tve orders throughout. 
Morgan adopts Alexander's concept of the Wisus •hioh is the 
1. P• 28 Emergent Evolution by c. L. "Morgan 
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drive towards Deity. Tho N!sus begins a~ the level or space-
tlme and pervades the whole of e~istenoe. It onuses the 
emergents to go upwards toward Deity. For Alexander, this 
N1sus is strictly within the prooese of.' evolution end any 
entrance of an outside or alien tnfluenoe.!.s flatly rejected. 
Morgan use~ tho same 1nterpretat1on and adopts the ?Haus for 
his scheme. Tho lTisus towards Delty is import~nt in Al$xande:r-:ts 
scheme and is also essential to t:hat of liorgan. It is uaed in 
the same oense by Morgan in the effort to weave direction into 
emergent evolution. 
, 
Finally,.Aloxandor•s notion of Deity is employed in 
Morgnn•e evolut~,on. lTot only do they agree on the emergence 
# , , 
or matter, life, mind and values in this order, but the goal 
towards which all of the evolut1onsry process is heading is 
the eame---that of Deity. "On the one hand we have the total-
ity or the world, which 1n the end !.s apntio-te1-nporal; on the 
other the quality of De1ty ~n~endered, or rather being en-
gendered, within that whole. These two features are united 
in the conception of the whole world aa expressing itself in 
the character of deity and 1t is th!a and not bare Space• 
1 
Ttme which for speculation is the 1.deal oonoopt1on of God.u 
We see the inclusiveness and yot the tra!'!scondent ch~raot­
eristlos of Deity in a similar stato':':1ent from 'Morgan. "We may 
l. P• 354 Space, Time nnd Deity by s. Alexander 
15 
aoknowledge physical events as '1lt1mately involved; and God 
. l 
on whom all evolutionary process ultimately depends." Thus, 
Deity is 1noluded within the evolutionary processes and ia 
also the goal towards wh1oh the Nisus is driving all emergents. 
In Chapter five, we shall review some points wherein Morgan 
~ 
and Alexander are in opposition but from this brief'- review, 
we see that Professor Alexander with his concepts of spaoo-
~ * • ti , J 
time, emergence, emergents, order,- 'Nisus, non•alien 1nflu~noe, 
and Deity played a tremendouc influence upon Lloyd Morgan. 
l. P• 298 Entergent Evolution by c. Le Morgan 
CHAPTER II 
EMERGE1TT EVOLUTION 
16 
To Morgan, the concept or emergence not only applies 
in the field or biology b~t extends though the entire meta-
phys ioal eoheme or things. In his attempt to clarify his 
position, he bids us think of a pyramidal soheme (Fig. l). 
At its baae lies space-time and this extends throughout the 
entire pyramid of existence. Every event thnt occurs does 
so within the limits of space-time. 
t 
Fig. 1 - -- - ~ -- - __.., z., 
\ 
\ 
.\ 
From minute point-instants in spaoe~time emerged electrons 
. 
and when these entered into the!.r elnborate structures, atoms 
emerged. These atoms combined in suoh fashion as we know them 
now, and the ph7sioal world emerged from them. This is the 
view of Alexander and it takes us up to the dotted line in 
Fig. l. Here is where Morgante view fits into the scheme. He 
did not attempt to show how the physical order emerged but 
puts it under what is kn.own in his philosophy as rraoknowledg-
ment" • "Now for better or worse my notion of philosophy is 
that; while it involves the contributions of science in all 
departments, it should seek to express a constructive scheme 
of the world -· a consistent scheme which is conceived at a 
, 
level or refl~otive th?ught that supplements, though it does 
not supersede, scienoe. There r.niet be nothing 1n. this scheme 
, 
which is discrepant with soienoe; but, on this understand1.ng, 
there must be oonst1tut1ve features whloh complete the ?ther-
, 
wise incomplete delivery of strictly ec1ent1f!o tho·ught. That, 
, 
I think has always been the aim of philosophy. It will, I 
feel sure, continue to be 1 ts aim. It. seeks .to ~evelop a 
constructive creed and not only a wor~ing polioy. In e~y case, 
I want to nail my colours to the mast. In oredal terms, I be-
1 
lieve in a phys1onl world." ~ot ioe l!organ ts s ta temen t that 
he believes in a physical world. He admits th.at this is be• 
1. P• 59 Emergent Evolution by c. L. Morgan 
yond proof but is so evident that ·it deserves to have place 
in the plan of evolution, so he places it under his heading 
of "a oknowledgment". 
The stress in emergent evolut1on is on the incomln~ of 
the new. "There may be resultants without emeraenoei but 
.• 
1a 
there are no. emerrrenta without resultants. Then, 1t may be 
said that through resultants there is cont1.nuity in prof?ress t 
1 
through omergepoe there is progress in continuity." It is 
evident that things slrendy in ex!.stenne oan produce already 
known resultants and it ls a m!soonception to ascribe novelty 
to those resultants thst really are not new. But, every time 
an emergent emerges, 1t necessarily oauseB new resultants be-
cause of its unique oharncter. Morgon illustrates the con• 
oept of ·emergence in th1a way. Assume that the chemist has 
some liquid hented·to a h!r:;h temperature. Gradually the 
liquid is cooied:and slowly crystals begin to form that are 
new. Those crystals were a.Arived fror.:t the li.qu1n yet ncth-
1J:l~ could be paralleled or expl1cnblo between tbe oharo.cter-
. '· 
· 1s'f ios ·of the· two ... so it 1e 1n the evolut!onary process. 
Things, when they attain a certain degree of complex1ty, 
b:t-anch off or emerge into someth1nr: new• A~a ~ n in the case 
of the gases, oxygen .and hydroaen, we see an example of this. 
When the two are combined in a certain fashion something now 
and different evolves. It oame from the oT.yr,en and hy~rogen 
1. P• 3l Emergent Evolution by c. t. Mor&nn 
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but you onn not characterize it in the former stage before the 
actual emergence becaus~ its complexity has not emerged into 
a separate unique thing .. 
Within the whole of our P7!'"~m1dal oohe~e, emergence is 
taking place in smaller pyt'amida. There are three ma in 
, " 
. 
emergents ...... matter, life, and m:!nd. But in addition to 
these, an almost infinite number of little emergents evolve. 
Perhaps here it is best to introduce or explain the :"n.isus" 
towards Deit1 symbolized by the arrow towards Deity in:our 
diagram.. Th~s nlsus concept is the idea that all emergents 
have a trend'. upward toward Deity. Eaoh emergent hns its re-
, 
lative level within the pyramid and this presupposes a hier-
archy of emergents. ·The nJsus .bel1.ef la that th~ emerr,:ent 
trend is forward or towards the h1~her or "more". This iM-
plies that the physical world existed before life, life be-
fore mind, and so on. !'!organ belie•1es this niaua :!s pulling 
or d1root1ng everything to tho highest possible emergent ---
Deity. "It seems, as ! think on the evidence, that the 
higher we ascend 1 in the h1ernrohy --- and especially when 
when we reach human porsons --- the emergent coMplexity 
. is suoh that it appe~rs justlf 1nble i::o say the t no two per-
: sons are quite alike. Ee.oh person is an uniquely 1nd1v1diml 
pro~uot along one of very many lines or.aavonce --- say 
. . . 
Shakespeare, Goethe, Newton, end Darwin. If this be so, t.he 
n1sus towards deity on its strictly central l~.ne should cul-
CHAPTER III 
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Now that we see that the emerr.r,ents pursue higher d1r-
eot1ort; we may disouss th~ relation of the em&rgent to that 
from which it bas emerged. "Each higher sta~e 1s in turn 
supernatural to that wh1oh precedes it. In this sense life 
l 
is supernatural to the 1nortr,i:.n1o." 
Keeping 1n mind the n~sus, we oan easily eeo that 
enoh now emergent would in this sense be above, or super-
natUl"al to,. the thinp; from which it has emerged. Tho concept 
of involution will throw further light upon this relationship. 
~ . 
ttL1f& stands to matter inAeame kind of relation as mind 
. , -
stands to life. And this, I subm1t 1 onn be better expressed 
by saying that life involves a basis of matter just as mind 
involves a basis or life. The relation common to both is that 
2 
which I cnll involution." Involution indicates a state of 
1. P• 29 Enier,:r,ent l!!volut!on c. t. Horgan 
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complioation or ~htang1ement. It 1s a state or being in-
volved. In emergent evolution, eaoh emergent level in aeoend-
ing order cannot oome into be in~ eave as "involving" the level 
. ~ 
or levels that are below it. Or, we mtght sa,y that eaoh new 
emer~snt must be preceded by other emer~ents w1th wh1oh it 1s 
associated. With Morgan then, involution 1s used in a sense 
of dependence. At any given level, the manner in which nat• 
ural events run their course nepends on the_ type or kind or 
relatedness which has emergen at thnt level. In other words, 
life oou1d not have evolved except for the pre•existenoe of 
matter, because the conoept and reality.of life itself nec-
essarily involve an existence of matter. In like manner th& 
emergent, mind, involves the lover leve!I., life, and with 
each; emergent eome,preceding or 10V1er lovel :ts involved. 
'•!.•: 
' •• > •• .. ~ -,::·. •• 
Thie sense of connection and dep~~denoe is called 1nvol-
ut1on in Morgan's ~rersion ot emergent evolution. Tho oon-
oept or involution is particularly important in asoertaining 
the order of emergents .for we oan observe which emergents al.'e 
. 
involved or dependent upon other emergentj. For example, life 
, 
!e not dependent upon oonsoinuancss, but oan exist before 1t 
and independently of it. But, aonseiouenese oan not exist 
before life, neither onn !t 6Xist apart from 1t, This is 
involution• Again we catch some idea of the relation 0£ 
th.$, emergent e.nd th.at from which 1 t is ·emerged. "If one 
23 
says 1 in teohnioal usa~e, that crystals are emergent in a 
cooling solution, one implies that they were not actually 
, . 
thel'e, ox- anywhere, prior to such emer('l'.enee. Then and there 
they just oome es something new, so -rsr as that solution is 
ooncerned. This does not mean that they oo~e into be1n~'out 
of noth1ngt fol" they come into being out of the oooiing liquid. 
'Nonc:t the less, as crystals, they are new for they were not 
. l 
actually in existence aforetime." So we see there is a 
direct connection between the two but that the emergents are 
not direct descendants of those things from wh!oh they emerge. 
'Now that we have summarized the view of the process of 
emergence and its nisus, th1s question follows. What is it 
Morgan ala1ms to be emergent? It is some new re1atedness or 
new kind of relation. It seems that this new emerged relation 
would bo abstract but it· is not so with Morgan. It is oonorete. 
Every emergent then• 1s :tn reality a dlfferent or new type of 
relatedness. Relatedness includes·not only relation-of•te:r-is 
but terms-1n-relet1on. That 1e, not only does the new emerg-
ent possess a rEtlat1on amonp: othe:r emer~ents, 1 t has an inter-
nal relatedness as well. Morgan uses the term "1ntr1ns1c" to 
denote relatedness within the 'mique e:vstem of the emergent 
(terms in relation), and the word "extr1ns1o" for relntion-
1n•terms (relation to eone other system). There are many 
1. p.12 The Emergence ot Novelty by c. L. Morgan 
types or both kinds of relatedness and the different kinds 
, , , 
suoh as ooneoiousness. life, ohem1oo-phys1oal, spatial and 
temporal relations ma~ exist independently or they may be 
, 
ao~ex1stent. In other words, one em~rgent or new relatednews 
doea not necessarily exclude another. 
What causes theee emergents to emerge? It 1s an all• 
inclusive Activity or f'oroe that 1e purposive and d1reot1ve. 
God or Activity is the source of all evolutionary· events and· 
is ~ers!stent from the baso to the apex or our proposed pyra-
mid.. Mor'gan frankly accepts Activity under his ooncept of' 
"Acknowledgment" rather than attempting to prove the point. 
causation and causality need to be distinguished although 
they are not contradictory. causation startsJ causality 
. 
continues or 1s the snrna..or happenings. Morgan, unlike 
, 
Berkeley, who denies any diff'erenoe, d1.f'ferent1ates the two, 
but .claims tba t no gulf exists between them and that they be• 
. " 
long to th~ same realm. So in an ultimate sense, God or 
Activity ia causation and causality. 
to the pyramid but is in· its limits. 
causality 1a not external 
" 
In faot• there is no 
alien influence w~atsoever that alters or affects evolutionary 
events in any way. Here we detect a carry-over trom Morgan•s 
philosophy or biology. He rejects the outside push or the 
v1talist an11ns1sts that all reality lies within the pyramid. 
"Any insertion into phys1co-ohem1oa1 evolution of an alien in• 
tluenoe which must be evoked to explain the phenomena of 11.f'e 
25 
1a expl1o1tly rejeoted under the concept of emergent evol• 
l 
ution." 
We find that Morgan uses the word$ proj1oienoe, inter-
~ ' 
ven1enoe, and advenience to give us a clue to relatedness. 
Projio1ence is attained only on the ~ental level. It in• 
volves th& distanoe•reoeptor-pattern of vision. It is per-
ce~tual re~erenoe OO'tJ\plad with d1stanoe•reoeptors. "My 
. 
doctrine 1s that all that is minded is within us, and rounded 
primarily on the correlated outcome of rooaptor-patternsJ that 
th.er~ a~e physical things existent 1n their own right outside 
us in a hon-mental worldf and that the properties wh1nh render 
them objective in mind are proj1c1ently referred to these 
. 2 
things." Morgan means here that outside our individual world 
of existence lie things different from the mental aspect of 
~ 
ourselves, which are a result or peroeptual reference and dis-
tanc••recepto~s. When we refer to them, we• 1n a sense, 
attach a minded quality to the actual physical reference and 
this reference from our mind! to those things that do not in• 
. . 
volve the mental, is oalled proj1o1enoe. Projioient reference 
enables uo to ascribe to the v,.aual field more than what is 
. 
actually included 1n the distanoe~reoeptors. For example, 
!t I hold a coin in my hand and turn it until I actually only 
see an elliptical shape instead of a circular shape, the dis-
tance receptors enable me to see that one part of the object 
!. P• 12 Emergent i%o1ut1on t>y b. t. Margart 
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is·· farther away than another, but it does not appear round, 
, 
But, I. know tltt'ough past experience snd general knowledge 
, 
that a thing like a round ooin may be tilted, but not lose 
, 
1ts essential oharacter, so I see the oo1n 1n my mind as 
being oiroular although 1t arpears to me to be el.liptioal. 
This is projloient reference. The proper~1es I ascribe to 
tba eoitt at'e oe.lled projio1ent properties, 
,Ort«'. of these pro-j!o1ent propert1eti br1np;s ';lP the hit'!• 
toricnl controversy of 1deal1!m and ~ealism oonoern1ng color, 
Let 'U8 look briefly at this oontroveray and discuss Morgan•s 
" , 
views ooneern1ng it• Profeiu1o:r John Laird, who 1e a realist, 
believes that beautiful colors and nensationa are there 
.. 
whether any personal mind appreciates 1t or not. "A romantic 
revival may be needed to reveal the stateliness of Gothic 
, 
cathedrals or the serene grandeur or Alpine summits; butthia 
beauty and the worth of it belonged to the Alps and the 
1 ~ 
aanotua_ries a~l' the time•" vre note that ftf!- the realist, 
color is not dopondent upon the mind. On the other hand the 
1aeal1st maintains the '~1ew that oolor must be peroeived by 
some mind bei'ore. :tt, '.becomes a ):"ea11ty. Lloyd Morgan parts 
.. , ;:'' 
~ompany with both the 1de~11st'b and the rea;1et1e viewpoh1t in 
ar; -sense. We l"!Ot1oe that, 1n· his departure~ be still en;. 
l. P• 1~6 Study in Realism by J. Laird 
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dorses the realistio 1mpl1oat1on from a pragmatio stand-
point. "Beyond question we eot tas if• ~olour belongs to 
this thing or that or !ts very own ~1jht. To aot otherwise 
would generally reault in oonfua1on." But he goes beyond 
realism and idealism in msinta1n1nfl: that "Colour-perception 
involves certain pb:y's1olog1oal ohnn~es in the brain at the 
level of liteJ this again involves (if any reliance can be 
placed in the outcome of research in the field of colour-
. vision) certain apeo1al1eed phye1co-ohem1oal obs.nges in the 
retina on the choroid, or (more comprehensively) in the 
2 
retina cerebral system." "Thus at the top we fringe off 
into correlated oonsoioueneas, aeetheth1oally •qu~litied', 
and at the·bottom we fringe off into the physical. There 
js an; enchained set or events, subj act to emergence, from 
~ . . 3 
bottom to top, and the beauty of colour is struck out." 
"If the idealists assert that colour lives only at top in 
the mind irrespective of phys1oel correlates in the or-
, 
ganism, or 1f the realia t assert the t 1 t lives only at 
bottom in the thing, irrespective of physical correlates 
in the organism, I respectfully submit that eaoh goes be-
, 
yond the evidence, According to the evidence (if I no not 
; 
misread it) oolour lives in the whole s 1tuat1on; 1n other 
words it has being m virtue ot the extrinsic rolatedness 
!. P• 227 ltiiiergent Evolution by c. t. Morgan 
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as 
or person (body•m1nd) and th1ngJ but that which haa being 
• 
hi virtue or extrinsic relatedne~e1I call a pro~erty, not 
a quality intr1ns1o to the thing." Color then, 1a accepted 
as nn emergent quality. nowevorl llorgan holds that the 
instrument (the eye) 1s necessary to interpret the color. 
We may oonolude that Morgan is neither an extreme 1doal1st 
or realist here but aooepts the essentials or both. Thes$ 
proj1o1ent properties go tG mako up proj1o1ent re.terenoe, 
and produce the beauty of the rainbow and the other aea-
thetio enjoyments that we experience. 
"Adven1enoe" 1s meant to represent the physioal 1n.., 
fluence on the plane or mtitter. It is simply the relation• 
ship or physical ex1stenoes. The relationship betw~en ad• 
, ~ 
ven1enoe and projioienoe on the plan& or life, however, 
needs further discussion. This relationship 1a oalled 
, 
"!ntervenienoe"• Morgan states, "The position then is 
that advenient physical 1nfluenoe oalla fo:rth in the or• 
ganism a very complex system of 1nterven1ent ev~nte with 
psyohioal correlatesJ that theee events oulm:tnate in be-
havior towards the source from wh1oh the advenient 1ntiu-
enoe ~was er:riuent; and that projic!ent referonoe endows 
tbe thing with nll the meaninft, tbet aoorues under Qorrela-
tion, as the nat·result of all interven:tent events, thus 
r. P• 229 Entergent Evolutlon by C. 1. '.~orq;an 
rendering the acknowledged thing li.n object of perception, 
which,. for our reflective thought, is always in some mea-
. ' 1 
sure oonoeptualised.". \Ve nee thnt there exists a complex 
integrated system of intervenient processes on the inter• 
mediate plane of life. Those interven1c~t life-processes 
are involved in all proj1o1ent reference. They ooour with· 
in, the .organism and exist as l~nks between the phys !eel e.nd 
. 
mental, "they sre the intrinsic physical and physiological 
attributes of events which in their ~aych1cal attribute 
. 2 
have the quality of aonso1ousness." 
The question is rs1eea now oonoerning the meaning of 
oonso1ousness •. It seems !\forgan uses the term oonsoiouaness 
below the. level of mind. Not only does oonae~.ousneas exist 
here·, we may follo\'f it in. emar~ent evolution on down toward 
the bottom of our pyramid. Horgan ascribetJ psychical oorrel-
• . 
i ' 
ates which purport to be posse~e1ng "awareness" even in the 
lower levels. "But can it confidently be asserted th.at only 
at a. oorta1nlevcl of neural rhnotioning or even that only 
, 
in organic functioning does correlation obtain? If· th1s 
question be regarded as too speculative, let us ask: now 
far down ton the inside so to speak• does oorrelntion extend 
in us? There is at any rate so~eth!ng to be said for the 
view that no limits can be set to its downward oxtension; 
1. 1'· ~14 
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that not only receptor-patterns but all the phye1co-ohemical 
chan~es they involve have psyoh1oal correlates wh1oh it not 
directly still 1nd1reotly contribute to oonso!ous "awarene~s"J 
that just as physical novelty involves the Qontinuance of 
lower levels of physical existence so does psyohioal novel·ty 
1 
involve a oont1nuenoe of lower levels of psychical e:id.stenoe." 
Again, Morgan goes no farther to prove th1s assertion. It is 
placed under aoknowledgment. When proj1c1enoe takes plaoe it 
has been preceded by edvenience and 1nterven1enoe • The 
existence of consciousness or awareness may however- precede 
the neural or organic levels of existence. 
i., P• 308 Emergent Evolution by c. L. Morgan 
CHAPTER IV 
EMERGENT EVOLUTION (CONT'D) 
"In the natural course of evolutionary advanoe, one 
1 
may say that life is emergent on non-living matter" MorRants 
view is that life is superven!ent upon nature or thst the 
emergent lite, followed after the phys1oal world was in ex-
istence. Things of a physioal nntu~e were being continued 
by Activity e.nd being drawn upward by the Ntsue and when a 
certain degree of complex1.ty we.s atta~ned !n the h! ~est 
form or inorganic th1np;s, life came forth as a new emergent. 
Vlbat 1s the d1fferent1s of life? Thie queatlon is said to 
be unfair and irrelevant by Morgan. "Those who would single 
out from among the multitudinous differentiations of an 
evolving universe th~s alone for special interposition would 
2 
seem to do little honour to the Dtv1..nity they profess to serve." 
we note that there are no great ~aps or distinction between 
1. P• 52 Emergent Evolution by c. t. t~or~an 
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these emergents.. They are simply i_n aooorde.noe with the gen-
eral scheme of emergent evolution. Inorganic emer~ents reached 
a certain state and life en1err:ed supervenient to 1t. In 1 ts 
earlier stage1 life was or course very primitive and it grad-
ually began to take on new hor:tzol'\e and develop11 ftself through 
Activity and the Nisus to the h~ ~hast form of 11 fe that we ex-
perience today. Life_. when 1 t emerged, was an entirely TI8W 
kind of relatedness and therefore caused a new set-up of re-
lations throughout the worla of existence. Thou~h it came 
from the inorganic; it was unique and d!fferent.in its essential 
nature, as are all genuine emargente, and 1s not explicable in 
terms· of nature. However. ~-torgan uses the example of "living" 
radium atoms to try to f 111 in the 11nk from the non-living to 
the living. " ••• as I put it, coT1soiousnese 15 superven1ent on 
* life." The upward develop~ent of life and the complex cell 
advancement finally broke off into a unique phenomeTion wh1oh 
we call eons ioouenese. Thus, we note that oonso1.ousness 1s used 
here as an emer~ent. In the last chapter, we citen where Mor~an 
seemed to bel:t.eve that it preceded life.. As be!.ngs beoeme aware 
of things and other bei'l"lgs, development was oorrespond1ngly 
·accelero tea end another hi~h degree or ~omplex' ty was at ta :!.ne~, 
and m~nd emerged. It wae larp:ely the capacity and ab111. ty or 
the eye that brought this emer~ent about. The nervous system 
I. ~. 49 !mergen€ Evolution by c. L. Morgan 
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developed and the physical basis (brain) of m1.nii was ~ntaot 
before this main emergent took plaoe. Morgan oan not seem 
to decide whether this emergent oooured 1n the animal or~an!sm 
or the human body. He made a lengthy ~tuay of snJmals and 
proved certain "mental" powers to be in their possession. 
"One may picture the organism stnrtin~ with a certain amount 
of congenital automatism of the more or less def:tnite in• 
stinotive typ~ and paosing on to reach a certain amount or 
the acquired automatism of habit. The latter state is in l . 
part auperadded elements as well." These 1nst1nots oan be 
howeve~ developed to a high degree. "The foundations of 
ani'Clal intelligence rest on individual choice or eelect1on 1 
2 
which in turn is dependent upon assoo1at1on." ; He assumes that 
some animals do have :!ntell:t!:?'.ence and offers mai:iy 111uetrat1ons 
and experiments to substantiate this view, but f!nally concludes 
, 
that. they are incapable ·of reasonini:;. So, the th1ncr. that 
differentiates the "mind" of the anima 1 from the t of the 
hut00.n is the power to reason, but mind 1n the sense of intell..:. 
igenoe orginieted in the animal realm. "The evolutionary 
ascent of mind bas been as I believe, an advance throu~h new 
3 
products to further novelty." This means that m~.nd is a 
new "nevmese" and ·arose superveniont on 11.fe. 
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Is reason an emergent or is it a development of the 
" 
innate capacity of mind? Morgan lndioates that it, ~long 
with other 11 ttle pyramids' is an. em(')r;r,an.t. nwhen this kind 
of reflective procedure cbaractises the life of a rational 
being• have we here the emergence of something ~onerally 
1 
new in mental development? ~.believe we have." Emergent 
evolution believes there are oh!ef emergents and those which 
are considered as little emerr~ents wt thin tho boundaries of 
the large ones., Reason is a small emeri:tent under one of the 
main emergents • mind. Therefore, some lower forms of speoies 
may possess a mind and oonso!ousness but not be influenced by 
the emergent, reason• · In the development or unfo1d1.n~ or 
memory we get a good clue to the ascent of m1nd. First1 it 
is evident that there had to be so~eth1ng to exparienoe an 
ooourence .... this, Morgan onlle a "re~ister". The rep;1ster 
was by definition capable or "rei::.1strat1on". When the reg-
ister was able to retatn something- in its consciousness and 
cons 1der it 1 nretent1on" was being introduced. If at a later 
stage the same registration could be recalled to minn, 
'~l'tevival" was employed. Revival also might have been stimu-
lated by something outside the register and if it strongly 
invoked the register's attention, ttrecogn1t1on" was developed. 
Finally "reference" was existent when the original registration 
1. P• ~ll Emergent Evolution by c. L. Morgan 
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could be classified • 
. The mind is capable of a high degree of development. 
Morgan gives good instructions and theory concerning this. 
"Mental development is not only a matter of cognition but 
. 1 
also of the emotions and the w111." Values and aesthetic 
oapaoities are unfolded after mental emer~enoe, and we are 
in a trend to receive more and more as the evolutionary 
process continues. "Emer~ent evolution works upwards from 
matter, through life, to oonaoiousnees wh!ob attains in man 
its highest reflective or supra-reflective level. It eocepts 
2 
the •more t at each aseendini:i: stage." 
The nisus is attracting everything towaras Deity. But 
before we view this oonoept, let us note again the essential 
nature of emergence within our scheme. "Just as a oomb1nat1on 
ot two gaaes, ·oxygen and hydrogen, results in the production 
of water; having new properties, or as the chemist creates a 
new carbon compound by sj'l'lthesis, so man is somethin~ gen1unely 
3 
new-" It is to be noted that Morgan claims that each ascend-
• 
ing emergent 1s evolved "with" and not merely "from", just as 
the crystals are emergent with the liquid. This diffioult 
point in Morgan•s ph!loeophy may be more clearly understood 1f 
we realize tba t the new emer.o;ent, thou~h it is in a sense re-
la tcd to thet from which it is emerged, is unique and ls a new 
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type of relatedness. 
Now, we shall consider briefly the apex of our pyram1d---
De1ty or God. First we see God as directive Activity. This 
is a force pervading all of emergent evolution wh1ch aims at 
constructive consistency. The "manner o.f going" in all nat-
ural events ultimately depends upon this Aotivity. Secondly, 
Morganr- uses Dod as 1adentioal with the N1sus that dl'aws all 
things upward. "God as being, is the n1sus of the universe 
. pressing onwards to levels as yet-unattained, or as I should 
·1 
prefer to say, is the Nisus dirent1ve of the course of events." 
. . 
In the third place 6 we view God as Eff1o1ency. "But there may 
be something 'more in the heart of events than s,1oh :ieffeot:tve-
ness----namely that wh,oh one may speak or aa Eff!oienoy-----
something more than oeusat1on, wh!oh I shall call Causality--
something more than dependence wb1oh I oapitalize ae Uepend-
ence~" (We are to assume here that Dependenoe refers to the 
-
evolutionary process and not to Godl nin virtue or this; 
should it be aooepted, not only does something happen under 
erreotiveneas, but all that is emergent has being through 
. . 
Effioienoy. This, which of course may be rejected, is; for 
' 
those who take the risk of the higher acknowledgment, the 
2 
Creative source or evolution•-- this is God." God 1e eternal,, 
1. P• 34 Emergent Evofut1.on by c. t. Morgan 
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but !'in~s expression vt1 thin the pyramid of being. The entire 
. oonoept Of. God 1s included under ?.~organ's ''aoknowledg:nent" • 
The concept of Spirit desorvos cona1derat10n here be~ 
oauee !t is an important aspect of Lloyd Morgan's evolution-
ary hypothesis enc because 1 t has oormeot1on with the iC!ea 
and .concept of God. It 1 s mentioned 1n "Emergent Evolution" 
but. a more detailed discuss ion is found 1n "I,1fe, Mind and 
Spirit,., wh:!.ch 1e a later work. "Since it ls part of my aim 
to ~1stingu1sh life and m1na from Spirit I seek also to use 
d1st1not1ve words. Hence, I speak of •manifestations of 
Spirit•. But Spirit 1s nowise separable from life and mind, 
nor they from 1 t. What is g1.ven for reflective oontemplation 
is.a world-plan of natural events. I hold that this world-
plan is a manifestation of Divine Purpose. We human folk are, 
in lire and mind, integral parts of that world-plan. We t?o, 
are manifestations of Spirit which is 'revealed' within us • 
. . 
Each of us is a life, a mind, a Spirit and instance or life 
. . 
as one extlreasion of world-plan, of mind, as a ditf'erent ex-
pression of that world-plan of Sp!ri t in so far as the Sub-
. l 
$tanoe or that world-plan is reveele~ w'th1n us." Th& world-
pls.n or evolutionary process from the loweet form of in-
organic matter or spaoe-t!~e event to ne1ty ls a •'manifestation" 
or Spirit or of God, Then, Spirit is being partially revealed 
1. P• 32 Life, Mind and Spirit by c. L. Morgan 
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in you and me. I say, partially because we are only an 
individual instance of that whioh 1n full manifestation 
is universal. But not only are you and I manifestations 
of Spirit, even the emergence and development of the rose 
is in accordance with Divine purpose a.nd weaves 1 ts part 
into. the great pattern or evolution. We notioe then that 
Spirit is not something emergent or divorced from life and 
mind but something that pervades the entire world of exist-
ence and causes it to develop in a teleological, harmonious 
way. It seems that Morgan feels that evolution alone is 
insuffioent and·beoauee the realization of this 1nadequaoy 
is so pertinent, he injeot·e. the idea or Spirit, whlch 
supple?l'lents and is an indissoluble part of ea<'!h sta·~e or 
emergent evolution. Mor~an .replies to the assertion that 
evolution might bring disastrous results to reli~ion 1n 
this way. "There is no disjunctive ant1thesls or evolu-
tionary progress and Divine purpose. The question: Is 
there one or the other, has no meaning if there always be 
one with the other. My ohief conoern is to present the 
l 
point of view of one who accepts both." This is an attempt 
to make the natural and supernatural not only continous but 
equally divine and the expressions or man1fentat1ons in-
herent within our pyramid are an expression and manifestation 
1. P• IX L1fe1 Mind and Sp1r1t by C. L. Morgan 
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of Spirit whioh ultimately is God. 
4:0 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS II, III and IV 
To explain adequately the general scheme or Ll~y~ 
, 
Morgan•s emergent evolution, a,pyramidal scheme must be 
. 
introduced. Everything that takes place, does so.within 
the limits of th~ pyramid. There cannot by anr type or 
alien influence or force outside that affects the happen-
ings inside. At the base of the pyramid ts space-time. 
Alexander tries to account for the emergence ot matter 
from this 1nexpugnable basis but Morgen merely aooe·pte it 
as· a !"aot that cannot be proved •. ~Jorgan introduces the · 
idea of "acknowledgment" to reoonolle such things as the 
' inorganic world and activity. ·He uses the concept of 'ac-
knowledgment because ·he. feels :tha_t th1np;~ are not adequate-
ly explained without 1t. To have a complete comprehensive 
system, acknowledgment of certain things 1.s an essential • 
. . 
In the evolutionary scheme, there are countless resultants 
' 
and emergents. Resultants may o~our without emergents but 
emergents always cause new resultants •. The law of emergence 
does not coincide with the general idea of evolution. Emer-
' genoe in biology and in other spheres of the evolutionary 
' . 
set-up means tha~ the arrival of a new th1ng, broken off from 
a high degree of .comple:d. ty :tn the preoed1ng etage. It is · 
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exemplified by the oooliti5 of a hot 11qnt.<l sr.::11 the emcr,;ins 
crystals. The relation of the crystals is not altogether 
foreign.because they actually emert;e !.ll.h the liquid TIOt 
!£2'! lti but the crystals are certainly different and unique 
am have new form, so they are said to be emer~ents. The 
~ine pointing towards the apex or the pyramid 1s intended 
to symoblize the n1sus or force that la rull1np; the entire 
process of evolution towards De!ty. It causes emer~ent 
evolution to want the "more" and the more or test. 1e found 
t.owards the apex of the pyramid. The thing that Morgan 
· actually claims to be emergent ie a new tvpe of re la teanesa. 
There may be extrinsic or intr!ns1c relatenness, but the 
emergent oomes as a novelty from the preceding state or· 
affairs. One wonders about the. oe.uee of omerp:enoe. Morgan 
different la te·s between cause. ti on a11d aausa 11 ty, as being the 
starting and oontlnu1ng of the process respectively. The 
source of emergent evolution 1s Aot1v1ty which is 1noluded 
under aoknovrledgment. In further explanation of emergence, 
the throe different types of relatedness are used. Pro• 
j1o1enae is that relatedness that le obta!ned only on a 
mental level. It is perceptual reference coupled with 
distance-receptors. It enables us to view a th1nR on a 
higher level than the bare phyeioal. Advenienee 1s the 
physioal influence on the plane o~ matter such as the epaoe 
relationship between physical objeots. Intervenienoe is a 
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type of relatedness found on the plQne of life. The inter• 
venient processes are essential to the projio:lent proces$eS 
, ' 
because life emerged before mlnd. Matter, life, and mind 
. 
are the chief emergents. Matter is acknowledged, ana life 
emer~ed after the inorganic prooess had atta~.ned a high 
, 
~egree of complexity. Life is auperven1ent to ~stter, but 
as the ~eneral law of emerrrence states, it. is· not explicable 
in terms ot matter. There is no greater gap here· thnn in the 
othe~ emergents. The same general law charaoter1~ea the en• 
tire process. · Coneoiouaneen 1e oors1dered ao a forerunner 
of mlnd and it too, is an emorp;-ent.. In the ascent of mind, 
one of the main factors was 1n the oomplex·development of 
. ~ . . ' .: " .. ', ..... ~·~ '.·.· 
the nervou.a· .system, largely the: eye. · When:~the pcroeividng, · 
prooess was highly developed, mind emerged to recall the 
perceptions, and to function in an entirely,.ri~w rElalm. 
Animals are considered to have :lnte111genoe but not rational 
powers, although Morgen 1o not ao~atio 1n denying them all 
reason. The unfolc1ng or da~relop'ng of memory involves the . 
register, the reg1etre.t1on, ~he retention, the revival,- the 
recognition and the reference. God ts used in several wa7sJ 
" -
first, as the directive Activity; seoon~ly, as the i'l!aus; 
third, es the Efficients and f1nally1 as Causality. The 
process of emergent evolution started a~d generated by Ood 
, 
is heading upwards to Him·~~d dur1n~ this acco~pliehment, 
things ·exist and .develop'.~and new emergents are eupervenient 
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to them. The oonoept of Spirit is used as the Divine Plan 
or way in wh1oh everything progresses. It is the "mani-
festations" of God. The most subtle appreciation of the 
a~tist or the poet, the highest aspiration of the saint, are 
no less accepted than the blossom of tho water-lily, the 
o~ystalline fabr1o of a snow-flake or the small 1ntr1oate 
structure of the atom. The theory of emer~ent evolution 
urges that the "more" of any given stage, even the '"''highest, 
involves the less of the sta~es which preceded it and con-
tinues to exist with it. It doea not interpret the higher 
in terms of the lower. This would imply the deniGl of the 
emergence of those new modes of natural relatedness which 
characterize the higher and make it whnt it ls. All thinga 
are upon the river of evolution floating towards deity and 
final development. 
CHAPTER V 
MAJOR DIFFEREUCES OF .'MORGAN AND ALEXANDER 
In the eeoond section of ohapter on~, we oo~sidcred the 
way in which Alexal'"lder 1nf'luenoed Morgan. We shall now d!s-
ouss briefly, not the mutual concepts ano 001.noiding elements, 
but the points wherein Mor~an and Alexander dissgrPe. A 
divergence is fou~d in the interpretation or· the status of 
sense-data. Alexander says: 0 In our ord1,.,ary experience of 
color, the oolor is separate froM the mtnd and completely 
independent of it. In our experience of the oolor•s be-uty 
. 1 
there is indissoluble union with the mind." I think 
Alexander tends to~ards realism here for he ~eans that oolor 
resides in the thing seen, w~ th whioh an organism having the: 
quality of oonsoiousness may or ma7 not be oompresent. In 
other words, oolor to Alexander is intrinsic to the thing as 
its own emergent quality. We recall that !.torgan aaoribes 
1. P• 244 Vol~me II Space, Time and Deity by s. Alexander 
color to the entire pyramid of the whole situation both 
mental ·and physical. Thus, we see that :t.!or~an rejedts· 
the view that oolor 1s an 1ntrins1o quality of the thing 
beonuee the higher level (mind) 1s neoeaaary. Alexander 
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leans he~v1ly toward realism. 
' . . 
Morgan leans in the opposite 
' . ~ . \ . 
d,1rect1on toward$ .1dea).ism, at least in his 1ns1stanoe that 
the psychical faotor is necessary for the existence of oolor. 
This divergence. leads farther~·: Alexander postulates a 
·non..;menta.l world in which colors, odors and sounds are 
emergent qua.11 ties.. This is opposed by Morgan. "I am oon-
oerned to state distinctly that a sense-datum is not, fol" 
, 
my interpretation, a gift until it is received, and that 
1 
the person as recipient; only has 1t when !t reaches him•" 
, 
With Alexander; it seems that the secondary qualities emerge 
right along "''!th the emergent but Mo:rgan we 1ts until mind 
, 
bas emer~od in order to npprehend these qua~1t1es, and. they 
are not real until a m1nd has reoeived them. 
T'ne God Concept of both thinkers cono1dee 1n one res-
pect (?Tisus) 1 but ltorgan's idea or God diff'ers in many ways 
from that of AleY..ander. · Ale,ce.nder oonsidors Deity as an 
emergent quality toward which everything is yoarn1ng but 
never attains. "God as actually possessing deity doea not 
1. P• 42 Emergent Evolution by c .. L. Morgan 
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exist but ie an ideol~ 1e always beoomi_n~a but God as the 
l 
whole universe t~nd~ng tow~rds de~ty does exist." Thus 
we note thnt deity 1s the goal that is never attained. God 
1a thE:l whole pyramid tending tovlards th~_s emergent quallty. 
Lloyd Morgan considers God as soMething in a se~ae outside 
t~e yearning and striving, as He seems to be represented as 
having already attained what the prooess is tending toward. 
"If one may claim that acknowledgment of God• on whom all 
. 
tlatural events in their asoent, notwithstanding lapses to 
lov1er levels, are untimately dependent, is less permissible 
at the bar ot philosophy than that other aoknowledgment of 
a physical world, our current e~per1enoe, so largely infected 
by the relativity of appearance, swings between the 1nfra-
v1tal beyond of materialism and the supra-personal Beyond 
. . , 
of Immaterialism. Both, as beyond, are atriotly speaking, 
outside the· r~~lm or appearanoee in the body or our pyt'amid ••• 
' ' · . 
. ···' . 
There should be no disjunctive anttthes1a between the timeful 
and the timeless. They are not to be regarded es inoompat!ble 
oontradiotories ~· D1f"f1oult as- the task may be they must in 
2 
some way, be combined in a higher symthesis" •· "God is All 
~ 
in a11 but in diverse modes and degrees of manifestation." 
:clad is an object for oonteniplat1on in the same sense as is 
4'1 
a personal self in social regard. In other words, what is 
objective 18 a concept of aoa.· It is God that we contemplate 
and God or Deity ~hat has whet we are seeking. It boils down 
to this; 1t seems. Morgants God is the Nisus plus .Act1v1ty 
plus Efficiency plus Spirit plus Divine Purpose plus God as 
a~ eternally existing goal of the evolutionary process. 
Alexander.fa Deity is that highest emergent quality toward 
' 'l . 
i 
which all'things are striving, which has neven been attained • 
. Then we may conclude that Morgan hi less panthe1stio than 
Alexander who includes God within the prooess alto~ether. 
But, in contrast with Alexander's ?H.sus, we know Morp;an 
assumes a personal, purposive, spiritual Being. 
Though both men accept the concept of emerp,enoe, there 
1s a distinct difference between their 1nterpretat1oris. 
Alexander views the emer~ent as something th!lt evolves 
"trom". a lower level o:f existence• He calls his emergent 
·"quality". Things· are emerged "from" things. Morgan 
II II 
accepts the idea of from to a oerta in extent but for. his 
particular interpretation, the emergent must emerge "with"· 
the thing from wb1oh it emerges. A new type of "relatedness" 
instead or ·"quality" is what Morgan olaims to be emergent. 
The concepts are in a way similar but ( . Uorgan tf.ttaohee·the idea 
, of "with" to Alexander•s ":from". 
Again, there is a. part1n~ of the ways in the concept of 
. 
the mark of the .past or memory. Morgan says, "Note that 
48 
againness is a oharaotel" of certain presentat5.one in full 
swlng; that passing- awayness characterisen the fading pre-
sentat1onJ but that cominejnese a+.taohes to a re-presentotion 
wb!oh forestalls a like preseTitat!on and therefore impldee 
prior experience or normal routine. They are quite d1s~ 
t1not1vely oharaotere wlthin the emorgent quality of: con-
. . 
soiouanees and enter into oompos1t1o'J"'I only when this level 
of evolutions~y advance ia roached. But they involve 
phyn1olog1cal and phynioo-ohom1cal proaesees on the planes 
or life and of matter; and they cannot adequately be inter-
preted, under emergent evolution, 1f these be not takem into 1 . 
oons1derat1on." Thus, we see that tho post for Morgen is 
no more, the future is not yet, and their marlcs are oharao• 
ter1st1o of present evcnte. They offe~ data tor referenc& 
to a "conceptual sobeme of the past end the future no less e , 
present in mind." But, on the other hand, Alexander oon-
, 
aiders that the past is proaent and esnent:tal to· the enjoy-
ment of memory. fiben we speak of ~emory we may mean 
! 
remembering~ This is universally sd~~tted, I think, to be 
mental. But whnt is 
-
remembered is not universally so re-
garded. There are aomo who consider the th!n~ that 1s 
remembered to be non-mental~ Professor Alexender 1a one of 
these who supports such e belief, When this or that is 
1. P• 146 tiliergent Evolution by C• L. Morgan 
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remembered, "experience declares the me~ory to have the mark 
of the past on its 1'orehe.r•<1, 
1 
nn~ the expooted, the ma:-k or 
the future." T'nle mark, I take it, is riot put there by us. 
It is found there and therefore can be considered as a non-
'!:lental mark. In other words, Ale.xander mc!nta!ns tbat we 
ca? experienoe !!2!. and~ at the same tima. He says, "A 
tract or brain may be oocup!ed either by a present or a 
2 
past enjoyment." Morgan expllo!tly rejeots·this as has 
been shown. 
The greatest contrast that appears botween rrorr;nn and 
Alexander is found in the ~ot'cept or T"lan. For l'orann, every 
happening is a manifestation or expression or thG ~rent world-
plan. Morgan states, "As a matter of direct observation and 
under such reflective treatment as enables the ob~erver to 
furnish a descriptive plf:l1n tale, this, that, or the other 
set of evonts;.whloh affords subject-matter for speoial 
inqui~l'"i runs its course on a plan-not infrequently ~-n a 
~outino with recurrent phases. The subsistent plan or the 
routine-•this, that or the other--1s a pla1n•tale Snferenoe 
3 
from the several instances wh:!oh are cUreotly o:~served." 
Thus we notice that Morgan fits the idea o-r-aonoept of plan 
into the entire explanation of plain-tale of evo1'1t1on. 
Everything runs its oourse-1n a plan and there exiats a ~eat 
1. p. 14~ Elliergent Evolution by C. L. :for~n 
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world-plan or Spirit. We search vainly for a grant plan 
or Spirit in Alexander. T:-:1np.:a happen due to the"r in1'H.v!dual 
natures and are !n n sense 1!''3ependent" There 1.a no Divine 
Purpose or fulfilment of a pattern. 
Tb.us we see that Mor,,.an d :tffers frcm Alexander 1:n re-
gard to sense-aata* memory, emer~enoe, God, an~ t.he world-
plan. These differences do not ~ivoroe the two syatems 
altogether but 1nd1oate that there 1s a definite "parting of 
the waya" oonoerning certain ooncepta betweon 'Morgan and 
Alenrtder. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
PROBLEMS 
l. Reoono111ation or Novelty 
In emergent evolution, "eaah asoend1n~_sta"-e ln the one 
l 
attribute is .evolved with that of the other." Each emergent 
is supposedly new, yet is has evolved in some way w!th the 
thing to whioh 1b is supervenient. For the sake ot clearness, 
we shall use a simple compound for 1llustrnt1on, that of 
' .. 
water. The view of emergent evolution seems to 1nd1oate that 
' 
with the union of hydrogen and oxygen, water emerges as a new 
type of relatedness with new relations but still with the th1n~s 
from wh1oh it emerged. Water is the emergent and the oharao-
terist!os and union represent the.high degree of aomp1ex1ty 
trom which water sprang. Now, the d1ff1oulty 1s found in 
this question. Is' water someth1'lg 1ntr1ns1cly new or is 1 t 
. a mere combination or two physical existences that take on 
1. P• 116 Emergent Evolution by c. L. Morgan 
a different set-up? Or, does water contain hydrogen and 
oxygen or did these two things by union produce something 
radically ne~ Thia seemingly ambiguous idea in Morgante 
" ,, 
philosophy, I believe 1e one that foroes itself into view. 
Any possible alternati.ve would contradict the system in 
general • h~noe the ambiguity. Let us first assume that 
emergence entailed the idea that each emerQ'.ent evolved 
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from the lowe?' thing. This would brin~ d1ffioul ty .to Mo?'gan. 
Alexander uses emergence in thts sense, "The emer~enoe or a 
new quality from any level of ex1.atenoe means that at that 
level there comes into being n oerts!n constellation or 
collooat1on of the motions belong~ng to the level, end 
possessing the quality appropriate to ~.t, and this collo-
cation possesses a new quality d1st!nct1ve of the h!~her 
1 
complex.'' This 1s the general connotation of the word 
emergent evolution. However, Lloyd Morgan attempts to 
inject a close affiliation or a deeper sense of relatedness 
between the emergent and that from which it is emer~ed. The 
idea of descendence or complete "fro'!l'lnese" is disastrous to 
his scheme. Morgan illustrates his claim of "withness". "A 
simple and familiar illustration must suffice. When oarbon 
having certain properties ?ombines w!th sulphur havin~ other 
properties there 1s formed, not a mere mixture ·but a new 
1. p. 45 Space, Time and De~.ty I by s • .Alexander 
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compound, some or the properties ·of wh1oh are quite d.1.fferent 
from those of either component. 'Now the weight of the oom-
. 
pound is an additive resultant, the sum of the weip;ht of the 
components; and this could be p~ediote~ before any ~olecule 
of carbon-b1su:lph1r'!.e had been former!• One ooulc1 any tn 
advance that ff CR!"bOl"' f! nd sulphur shall bo folmft to combine 
ln any iU!loertainablo proportions, there will be 31,oh end 
such weight es reoulta~t. Eut sundry other properties are 
oonst1tut1ve emergents which {1t 1e claimed) could.not be 
.foretold in ndvanoe or any 1nstanoe of -suoh oomb1.'!1at1on. 
_or ,,op\lrse·, when one has learnt what emerges !.n this pa.rt.-
• >';· ~' : I icutar instance one may p?'ed1ot what v1111 emerge in. that 
like instance under similar o!rc~1r.:a.tanoes. One has learnt 
1 
something of the nature. l plan of ornerger.t evolution.~ We 
understand that the prooeas not only· 1nvolvee 1nvolut1on 
between the -lower stages and the higher, but that enoh 
particular emergent pyramid is pervaded by both a "with" 
&l'ld "from" -nature. ·!.~organ ropeatenly emphasizes the fact 
that the lower level 1s not left o~Jt in t.h.e r.l"oeeas, but 
the.t it evolves "w~th". Thus, we see the t we oan'r'ot asorlbe 
merely a·senae of fromnp,ss to his achene. On the other hand, 
we are not able to interpret emer~ent evol,1t1.on purely on 
·terms of withnese because or his 1ns1stence of novelty. 
"But if nothing new emerge - !f there be only re_g?"oup1ng 
1. P• 6§ Emergent Evolution bY c. t. Morgan 
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ot pre-existing events and nothing more - then there 18 no 
1· 
emergent evolution.". There must be an emergence of novelty .. 
a type or newness. The real emergent is a ~ type or re• 
latedness. 
The issue may also be stated in terms or quality and 
relations •. Does Morgan mean that from the l:ower level·or 
relatio~s ·a new quality arises? No - thls is rather the 
definite clear-out idea we derive from Alexn~der.. In fact, 
Alexander olaim8 that the .emergent '-s simply a quallty that 
emerges from the lower level. · Does Morgan mean that. from an 
old relation a new emergent relation or relate~nes" arises? 
This is his view• But, he ~ns1sts that this !s concrete 
and .not abstract, to aceount for material substance, "I 
want to make quite clear w~at I shall always m~an when I 
use this word. It hae rather an abstraot look, but what I 
call an instance of relatedness is through and through oon-
orete. It inoludes not only t~e r~lstion-of-.terms but also 
the terms•1n-relat1on. An ntom is an instance· of related-
.. 
ness; so, too 1 is an organisms· and a person. Any entity, 2 
as such, is an instance of re la tednese," Here we review 
Morgan's attempt to attach ooncreteness or physicalness to 
the new emergent. But he claims a relation in t.he actual 
emergent. ·"If it be asked: What is 1t that you claim to 
1. P• 2 '§iergenE Evolution by c. t. Morgan 
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l 
be emergent? .. the brief reply is: Some new kind of relation." 
Now,. if .the new emergent oolJld be seen es a relation and yet 
be concrete,· a problem arises. Can qualities be reduced to 
relations and nothin~ else? It seems that !!organ would. have 
to say that not only does a new relation ar1sel but an aeoomp-
· any1ng quality .. For instance, in the emiasgenoe of the color 
red. If anything cones near being a quality 1t is this, and 
apparently red is not a tnere relation and nothing more • 
• Th~re se~m to exist emergent gualities and if this be true, 
Morgan would need t9 asAu~e that qua11t1es plus new relations 
compose the new emergent. If we co~sider that this new 
emergent is evolved !l!h and ~ ~ the lower level, we 
arrive st the mentioned difficulty of novelty. Does Lloyd 
Morgan add to the concept of emern:ent evolution or :1oes he 
needlessly complicate it? I believe he confuses it here 
beacuse of the simultane01.Js use o~ oppos!.11~ or -1noompat1ble 
ideas•• namely, "fromness" and "w'. th~eas". There should be 
a reoonc111nt1on of novelty w~th1n the l!m:tts of !Jorgan's 
philosophy but it seems that this problem rAmn!ns unsolved. 
!. 'P• 69 tniergent Evolution by c. t. Morgan 
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2. Minor Problems 
a. Spatial-Tempor•al Re la todness 
In the beginning of this eneay, this quaat1on wos 
alluded to 1n brief. The inquiry was oonoern~ng the 
possibility of the existence or apace and time apart from 
. 
56 
physical things. But, since IJloyd M·organ uses the concept, 
space-time, it would be best to atote the problen in this 
manner. Is spatio-temporal relatanness capable of existence 
apart f'rom physical events? 
.It may be asserted that this problem does not apply 
directly to Lloyd Morgan. It :!a :f'undaMeritally an aspect or 
Alexander's philosophy~ but Morgan aooepta :tt and uses 1t, 
. 
under "acknowledgment", so my oontent1on 1s that the assump-
tion is needed in bis scheme, therefore 1t 1s. permissible to 
question it here. It eeemo that t!me ia not something to be 
considered as pre-existent because it is merely an attribute 
or charaoteriatio of capacities of a physical nature. My 
' . 
view hero is not, aowever, that motion preceded time. The 
point is that motion which involves time is something appl!-
oable only to something phystoal. It is incomprehensible to 
f!Onedder the physical movement of abstractions. If we agree 
,. 
that motion necessarily involves physical existences, we can 
. . 
then ask if motion presupposes tl:me. The answer, I think is 
in the affirmative. T!me, as we commonly speak of it, is 
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either the period during which an aot1on or process continues 
or that which purports to be measurable. If no action or 
poroess occurs or thero is nothl1'1f'.. to be mesaured 1n a durat-
ional aense• then there is no time. so, because of this feet 
we conclude that t1me presupposes or lr.ipl1es the physloal 1 so 
we say time prea\lpposee phys!oel ax1stenoea ~T'lcf cannot poss• 
ibly exist' without ,'them. Space ic th~t ?1h1 ch 1~ oharaoterized 
by e·xtens1on in all df:ro~t~ons, 'boundlessness, and 1.ndefinit:e 
d1v1s 1b111 ty; the sub jeot of ti e+.ermlnat:tons of' pos '·t fon and 
direction. It is cHffiOlllt to ~.magl'l"e e wo,.ld of spaoe and 
it also is diffioult to imagine no apace. However, from an 
observational point or view, wo are able to see that the only 
tGl'mS that we onn know space are those involved in pbys1oal 
existence• ·rn the mental world, there exists no space 1n the 
sense 1)f extension. To me, 1 t ls nonsense to ndvoca te that 
space occupies apace. Space seems to be rather a relation 
or a capacity of physical objects. If so, then we may apply 
' our argument again end contend that space presupposes physical 
objects. 
However, ~.t must be aokrtowledged that tho actual basis 
Alexander and Morr:an use :!s not space !.!!9. t-tme but spaoe-
t:tme. This 1s offered as s supplement to the three spatial 
dimensions and is .knor1n as the space-time cont!rmum. Their 
assertion is that this basis is not apart nlto~ether from a 
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physical nature because the es~ent1al nature or space-time 
is that it is the notua:t stuff of which all real1. ty ls com-
posed. "In truth, 1nf1T"1te Spacei.;.T1me 1a not the substance 
. 
of substances• but it is the stuff of substances. No word is 
C' 
more appt'opr1ate to it than the ancient one of hyle(U~)\ ). 
Just as a roll of cloth is the stuff of wh1oh eoats are made, 
but it is not itself a coat, so Spece-Time is the stuff of 
which all things, v;hether as aubstsnces or under any cate-
gory; are made. If I oall it the stuff nnd not the mnter1al, 
1t is to avoid confusion wtth the very much more speoif"io 
. 1 
idea of msttet-, as matter is commonly understood. rr.. Yet we 
realize that thi?n;;a may endure w1thout. occupying space. For 
example, I reMember my barefoot days. Th1e is an existent 
but 1 t requires no spa oe. The oonte!lt ion of these Men. 1e 
that the two (space and time) nre lriseparable. "In 1~.ke 
ma~ner there is no mere spr.ce or ~ere time but only Spaeo-
2 
Time and Time-Space." Although this contention is me.de, I 
believe we hevo a good case for their separate existent 1n 
the realm of abstraction and memory. It seems that duration 
may be ascribed to those things wh~ch are recalled er used 
by the mind but they do not occupy space. They could not be 
oharacterized by space-time because they nre not mace of 
'"physical" sturr and space-time pU'l"ports to be composed of 
1. p. 341 Space, Tlme nnd De~ty by s. Alexander 
2. P• 48 Spaoe, Time and De1ty by R. Ale~nnder 
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"physical" attributes. The contention here is that there 
s~ems to be n reality of time ~e A th1n~ 'ndapendent of 
spnoe • Memory shows us tfl.s t vre "!10y attach t:tme ·to e'rtrnta 
which hn'1e oe~ureCI a '!"ld do rot· 1n,Tol,re spnoe for the •,r ex-
ls tenc&. ·.The fnot 'of historloal evente ts an 1Jluatrat1on'' 
of thts po!~t' We can use the nn~cepts "before" and "after" 
to characterize past Avants e,...d ft t them irrto a ,.:f pf:frd. te 
chronoloe;1cal acherie. Ap;a1n, in the case o.t' or1thriet1 cal 
. or abstract reaaon~nr: we are able to n~r,crtatn durnt"o:nal 
' as'pects though space ia· '.rnnecesanry. A premise :tn a logical 
problem 1s reta lned wh1.l~ the coT1olns 1 on 1 s beh'lg reached 
and things may precede or follo'!i one another 1.n ob:Jtrect 
reaaon.tn~ throughout. If th!.s 1s posr,1ble end absolute or 
pure.: time 1a ad-nltted; than there eY..~sts a _prc1)1ern at this 
point in emergent evolution. 
b. Life and Mind 
~~1<"e,seems to bee vaguen<:as concerning the beg1T'lntnP'.S 
of,')J.f&''S.rid mlnd nnd their d~st:tnot1on from each oth~r in 
Morgante evolut!.on~,. Tha:re are :-isl'ly ~:nrUcnt1ons that '~organ 
reverts to the 'httr1butes" of Spinoza. ITe see~s to subs-
titute matter for "extene!or1" and mind for Sptnoza' s ~thou~ht". 
1l1nd ls to be foun~ rlown at the lower levels of" existence and 
is an attribute of nature. ";v1th!n the wbole domn!n or those 
integral entities we call organfs~ there 1s oonoom1tance of 
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ot mental events with bioses - that 14 physical and physio-
1 
logical events." We see that the mental exists in the 
life level and also on the level of nature. "For me, in 
the good company of Spinoza end his followera, m1nd ls with-
in one of the two "attributes" or nature. It is the natural 
correlate of oertain physical events which belong to the 
2 
other attribute." "Throughout the story of reference the~e 
is an accompaniment of bodily action; throughout the story 
of !ntluenee there is an acaompaniment ot reference and 
enjoy~ent• But both ere Included in one synthesis: and 
underlying both -- common to both •• is substantial unity, 
one and indivisible. In the distinction I draw between 
two stories I do but echo Spinoza. For me, as for him, 
•substance thinking and substance extended are one and the 
same substance, comprehended now throu~h one attribute &Tid 
3 
now through the other." We see here than Morgan adopts 
Spinoza's oonoept or "thought aTid extension" at least 1n 
its essential function. He not only speaks of mind in th1a 
sense but it is also treated as an emergent. "Under what 
I here oall emergent evolution stresa is laid on the in-
coming of the new. Salient examples are offered in the 
l. P• 11 Li~e, Mind and Spirit by c. L. Morgen 
2. P• 27 Emergent Evolution by c. L. Morgan 
3. P• 249 Life, Mind and Spirit by c. L. Morgan 
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advent of life, 1n the advent of mind, and !n the advent of 
1 
r~fleotive thou~ht." Tho problem thnt Prises coneorns the 
double aspect or role of m1nd. How can it be used in an 
innate or developing sense and also as an ·.emergent? A:n 
emerr,ent is by definition so1'?1cthing new and un~.que and if 
mind persists along ?:1th oxtcnaion or matte?' from the 
base of our· pyramtd, there !a no chance for it to ba an 
emergent. Thus, the m~n<i conc~pt 1.r. Horgan brin.".a con-
tusion instead of clarity. Again, when we attempt to 
, 
classify life in Morgan's theory, we havo difficulty, nL1fe 
and mind alike belong to a different orr'ior of' bein~ \"1hioh 
cannot arise out of .. enn only net into - the m~terial order 
2 
of being." Apparently, Uorgnn addn life to this othor 1doa 
of thou"'.ht and extension because ! t is t'l"'eetcd hi the en~e 
way e.e mind in th1e ser..se. Could Horr,an Mean that mA tter, 
life and m~na are everlaatln~ e:x~stents? He see"Ms to hold 
- that this is true. However, he regards the same three 
levels of existenoe as h1.s chief emerc.;ents and cons 1ders 
them as being supervenient on the other (mind on life end 
matte:r). The problem ~Y be summarized 15r1etly: ThinBe oan 
not be used as immanent, everlasting as in Spinoza's sense; 
and still be nn"emergent" 1n emergent evolution. Morga~ 
seems.particularly vague concerning the concept of life• 
l. P• 1 Emerger?tEvolution by c. L. Morgan 
2. P• 136 Emergent Evolution by c. L. Morgan 
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Be asks us not to question the g'p between it end the thing 
from which it emerged and ~ives examples of the close 
resemblance between the hir..her form or the inorganic and the 
, 
lower f~om of life ( radium and one oell organisms), and yet 
assertn that it does not emerRe from the "material order of 
being"- This confusion is closely related to the probem 
we mentioned aoncetoning novelty. It s eema Uorgan needs to 
posti.Jtl.ate unique emer~ents bu~ also needs to retain. 
everlastingess and development. 
-·· 
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3• God. 
By Morgante oonoept of Spirit, we see that the pyramid 
ot evolution is in aocordanoe with Divine Purpose or a 
great plan. Different developments in evolution are groan-
. 
ing or yearning for greater attainment •. In this seneo, 
God is the Nisus towards deity. De!ty belcn~e to the order 
ot perfection. As the universe flowering to deity, Gori has 
no r1val1 just as on t!'le level of mt.,..dt there exists no un• 
mind. Deity in the universe as a whole 1e like life in ~ 
healthy body. God 1e the power wh1oh ~akee for deity. He 
1s the Nisua causing the· emerrr;enta to go upward• :<:r.ier~ont 
evolution is really ~ot suf~io!ent. God is the eternal 
perfect Energizer, a god who transcends t~e evolution 
process but not space-tl,..,e, Ile ~.s the direotivo .Activity. 
H& is the cause and Causality. Re ts the Eff1enoy and the 
goal and apex of the pyraM1d. Thie co~plex conc~pt1on of 
God has definite elements of the Ideeltst1o philosophers. 
Fichte, Schellin~, Sche:Itlermncher and Regel all ar,ree that 
the goal of the Absolute•e striving or the imr.ianent purpose 
ie self-expression, se1.f'-r.eal1zat1.on Eind relf-devclop::nent. 
The Absolute is the 1nf~.rd tc aot;1v1 ty of wh~ch all else is 
a manifestation. However, the Abaolnte Idee.11.ots ao not 
confine everyth1.nr, to spncr.:-t~me as does ':!organ. ~~orr,n-n 
mav be olass1f1ed es a Absolut:' 6{;j. bnt '"~e is 'YIOt en 
.. 
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Idealist. However, the problems that confront Morgan are 
similar to those that confront the Absolute Ideal1at. The 
real problem for !!organ with his God co.,cept is to present 
a reasonable synthesis between the traditional God ann the 
God or drive of the evolutionist. He wants to retain the 
idea that God is eternal nnd that the goal of the striving 
found 1n the evoJlktionat-y prooeaa is God but he also 
attempts to use God as the N1sus and in a sense everlasting 
or within the process. It does not seem plausible to oon-
oieve God as a goal and yet be used in the world-pleb in an 
immanent capacity. My contention here is that it 1s 
d1ff1oult to synthesize the two somewhat opposing oonoepts 
- , > " 
or God e.n·d that, for the sake of clarity and plausibility, 
Morgan should make a choice to ~nolude :t.n his emergent 
evolution. 
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CRAPTTm VII 
COUCLlJS IONS 
Emergent evolution is on attempt to account for whnt 
is before us. It, in a sense, pronll'?ts tho rutnre, re-
trospects the past nnd explains the ~~oaont. It offers 
the beat explanation that we can f1rid from an e'11olut1oner:v 
viewpoint because it gives the mont comprehens1ve 1.""ter• 
pretation of the universe. 
The interprotatio~s of Alexa~der and ~organ sre su-
perior to those of Smuts and :=-.elll\rs I thhik, beoauae of 
their inclusion of God and the N1suo within their roepec-
tlve systems. Alexander, I feel ~a the most brilliant 
of all, for he offers the most plausible soheme. He is in 
reality, the liasis for ~.!organ's theory. However, Morgan 
does present a unique, individual scheme that reflects 
philosophical ganlua and hia theory le a contribution to 
metephysies • But, Morge.l·, ra1st:.S d'!.ff1ou1!'1.en in ~is system 
that Alexander.does not have to cope w1th, namely, the 
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recono1lint1on of evet-lastinr; ex~.ctents and the "ft-om ntid 
, 
w1th0 idet\ of o~rgenoe, and confl1ctlns attributes of God. 
A'l.exrinde1~ nssorta that the omergonta are e-morr:;ed or 
q,ual1 tied "from"the '1ower levela r:nd not "v11 th" and God 
plnys a single comprehensive 2:-ole !t 
More than the others, . :lforgun loans toward a personal 
or somewhn t "orthodox~' God.· Ue ~;1ves us nn s.ttenpted 
synthesis bet':Teen evolution nnd God nmi prosente the teat 
theological theory. In this sphere, I believe, Lloyd 
lfO?:'gan ne.kes a positive addition to emol"r.rent e,rolution. 
Biology ini.tie.tcd the eohe~J Al.e~ander supplied a oor:t .. 
»'l"thene1ve ground-plan; tho nov-01 concepts of emerqonoe 
, 
and God gave it the proper dlat:lnotion; thus, Lloyd 
Morgan ts interpretation of emorF~ent evolution gave 1~zr 
metaphysical contribution to the field or ph:tlosoph7. 
THE ElID 
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